University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Documents on Outer Space Law

Law, College of

1985

The Interaction of Public Legal Orders: Impacts Upon Each Other
and Upon the Emerging Public Order of Space
Harry H. Almond
National War College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/spacelawdocs
Part of the Air and Space Law Commons

Almond, Harry H., "The Interaction of Public Legal Orders: Impacts Upon Each Other and Upon the
Emerging Public Order of Space" (1985). Documents on Outer Space Law. 1.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/spacelawdocs/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Documents on Outer Space Law by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Published in:

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Colloquium on the Law of Outer
Space, International Institute of Space Law of the International
Astronautical Federation, Lausanne, Switzerland, October 7–13, 1984
Published by American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
New York, 1985.

84-IISL-Ol

'l'HE INI'ERAC'TION OF PUI3LIC LffiAL ORDERS: IMPACI'S UPON EAQI Ol'HER AND UPON
THE EMERGING PUBLIC ORDER OF SPACE

Harry H. Alm:md

The National War College
Washington, D.C. 20319
Abstract

relations generally, these strategies determine
in large measure the shaping of law, jurists are
compelled to face strong tendencies, which, if unchecked under law, will degenerate into instruments
of naked power. Such instruments can undermine the
existing law, and deny the flourishing of law itself. Jurists engaged in justifying the use of
naked power as advocates of the policies of states
to control, without invoking valid and validated
claims to authority, become part of a state's
strategic policy apparatus.

The interaction of the public legal orders of
states upon each other, and upon the emerging
public legal order in outer space, and in general,
has long been recognized "by civilized nations."
The perspectives of this civilizing process as the
perspective of law are critical, because law has
always been identified as the assurance of protections it affords to peoples--or to states. This
is the correct meaning of "equality before the
law." It is also the reason why the concern with
human rights goes to the essence of the legitimacy
of any legal order. Moreover, the peoples of
states, as the_United Nations Charter declares at
the outset, are the true repositories of "sovereignty" among, within and between states.

Jurists, thenJface the possibilities in the
growing tolerances for naked power and its exercise that their common quest for serving global
order, for accommodating and adjusting the
differences of opposing social orders, and for
helping to shape strategies and the global social
order itself toward peace and security, will falter
or fail. Such jurists will be diverted from an
effective pursuit for the optimization of the value
demands of peoples, projected in the civilizing and
law-oriented claims for human dignity, and the
quest to uncover and overcome the obstacles in
achieving these goals. Like the Melians arguing
before the Athenians in Thucydides'Peloponnesian
War they will be tempted to acquiesce to naked
power alone.

In a true spirit of d~tente, disagreements
among jurists like those that arise from the states
from which they come, are relieved and moderated
by open debate, by recourse to scientific and
objective perspectives, by reasoned argument, and
by the continuing and candid exchange of views.
Jurists for this reason, as professional members
of an internationally-oriented endeavor, extend
their own efforts and analysis far beyond governments, primarily because they are not constrained
in their communications with each other. It is
under these conditions that the present inquiry
examines the general principles of law, and seeks
their constructive application in order to make
public order-projecting recommendations for
decision-makers.

I

Public legal orders among states and within
states must address at the outset the most critical
concerns that all states share in all of their
relations with each other. This is the concern
with operational security--both internal and
external security. This is a concern with the
fundamental policy that is present both in the
regimes expected to regulate territorial air space
and the policy to be shared among states in regulating activities in outer space. The policies of
states associated with this concern determine the
relevant principles of law that can be drawn from
the public legal orders of states and applied in
their shared public legal order, whether that is
the general legal order--and international law, or
the law relating to outer space.

The policy content is a critical indicia of
law-projecting decisions, and shares with the
authoritative element of such decisions and their
controlling force, the three factors that
characterize the law-oriented policy processes.
Against these elements of policy, authority and
control, this inquiry examines and compares the
views of two distinguished jurists: Professor
Grigori Tunkin of the Soviet Union and Professor
Myres S. McDougal of the United States. This
inquiry is preliminary in nature intended to consider the differences in perspectives of these
jurists, and also intended to consider the policy
implications arising from those differences.

In this inquiry the primary focus is upon the
legal regulation of force and, because much has
been developed regarding this complex subject, two
leading jurists have been selected for views,
believed to be representative of significant
perspectives relating to the regulation of relations
among states. Professor Grigori Tunkin, primarily
in his THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,l and Professor
Myres S. McDougal, distinguished jurist in the
United States afford an opportunity to compare the
differing perspectives of two major jurists, and
from the comparison to draw out possible alternatives in which jurists in general might better
serve the global community in establishing public
order and security. Because in these endeavors the
focus is upon the relations of states in 811 the
arenas in which they are competing with each other,
these relations, in a competitive power process,
become the primary focus of inquiry. No jurist can

Accordingly, the primary focus is upon
clarification of policies relating to the global
social processes. It is assumed that most
jurists will agree that the law itself and the
legal instruments of law are, like all strategies,
aimed at strategic goals, and applied as strategic
instruments of policy, among the major power
blocs, and by smaller states and regional groupings of states as well. Because in their
*Professor of International Law and Strategic
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absent himself from this process and also aim at
workable recommendations for a single state or for
the global community at large, nor can he omit the
overriding thrust of the United Nations Charter
and its controls.

The regulatory framework among states relating
to controls over international coercion--and more
emphatically over the use of force in their relations--is to be found in the United Nations
Charter, and in customary international law, supplemented by the law established among them to
further the expectations in this body of law
through international treaties and agreements.
The effectiveness of that regulatory framework is
to be found in the application, the shared invocation, and in the development--through institutions
procedures, and processes--of the prescriptive law.
The prescriptive law is to be found in the general
norms such as Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter, amplified by other articles such as
Article 2(3), and balanced by the realistic perception that states must seek their own measures
for self-defense--with or without the aid of
alliances--pursuant to Article 51.

The overriding perspective then is that
which perceives nation-states confronting each
other, largely through the major power blocs,
acting to support and benefit from their actions
in a competitive power process. Such a perspective perceives a loosely-organized order among
states. Foremost in the demands among states and
their peoples is first to build upon the minimum
order that they can establish, to then seek through
arms control and other foreign policy initiatives,
the means to reduce hostility, and pursue the
measures that strengthen that order and sustain
it. A more substantial global public order must
await the practice of states. The policy dimensions of law are clearly established when we seek
the primary "source" of law among states in their
practice--i.e., in their behavior patterns,
evidenced in their relations, and most specifically
in their actions, and in their decisions and policy,
their tolerances for behavior, and in the reciprocities that are associated with their claims and
counterclaims relating to what conduct is
permissible or impermissible.

Further prescription as such is not needed:
the Charter and customary international law,
coupled with ample practice among states,
reveals that no aggression is to be tolerated,
that the use of any weapons--not just the nuclear
and mass destruction weapons--for aggression is
equally prohibited, that behavior that is
aggressive, hostile or confrontational whether
within the social orders among and of states or
among them is contrary to the expectations of the
global community. For this reason, attention to
prescribing new law for nonaggression, for
restraints on the use of weaponry--first use or
all uses, and so on, are redundant and draw attention from far more significant tasks. The
effectiveness of law among states like that within
them depends upon an effective framework for projecting law as policy--and this makes important
demands upon all of those implementing measures
that depend upon reliable, effective, comprehensive
and timely communications that are accurate and
conducted in good faith. The present relations
among states suggest that the task of jurists in
promoting this great law-making effort is
formidable, and that the obstacles lie in the
great divergence in value demands--at least those
promoted and made among the major decision-makers
of states.

Codification and attempts through far-reaching treaty providions are meaningless if they are
not validated by the practice of states. The
"general principles of law" drawn from the public
legal orders become largely abstractions, depending
for their policy content upon application--and
therefore upon the practice of states themselves.
Foremost in the expectations among states under
these conditions is that they will be able freely
to act in their own self-defense.
II

The perspectives of all states regarding the
emerging public legal order among states
necessarily include as the foremost issue that
which relates to the regulation of the use of force.
While our perspectives also embrace expectations
that "peaceful purposes" must be served in outer
space, that states must engage in "peaceful activities," and that outer space is the "province of mankind," all of these remain at best policy goals or
principles whose policy content is to be
established in the future practice among states.

When states are insecure in their relations,
it is abundantly evident that their prescriptions-their prohibitions on the use of force or violence
or their undertakings to refrain from the use of
force--must be balanced against what they perceive
to be intrusions upon their security. For this
reason, the efforts to "define" aggression have
failed to enter into practice--and hence into
effective law. 2 For this reason, also, states have
pursued their efforts to test and ensure the
reliability of weaponry produced through modern
technologies. And, because compliance goes to the
essense of mutual and shared security, and depends
upon sound communications among them, it is evident
that all proposals for outer space to regulate
weaponry or the use of force in that arena will be
countered by the overriding claim involved in
self-defense.

Most important in our perspectives is that
which relates to the competitive power process in
which "sovereign" states find themselves. It is
possible to consider this process as innate to the
behavior of states that are drawn toward absolute
sovereignty, and it is also possible to perceive
that such expectations lead, necessarily, to
limiting public order, primarily by limiting the
application of community policies to the law-making
activities of states. States engaged in competitive processes aimed at power tend, in the extreme,
to favor naked power--power free of the conditions
imposed through law. If these tendencies are not
moderated, they are fed by actions and policies of
states aimed at military measures--at making the
military instrument the primary strategic instrument of policy.

Furthermore, because self-defense in any context means the use of weapons, ready, available
and tested as reliable, to counter aggression or
the use of weapons for aggressive purposes, all
states will insist that whatever actions are taken
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concerning the control of weapons, they will retain for themselves the weapons needed for selfdefense. This can only mean that their space objects whether defended from outer space--by themselves or through other space objects--or from
launchings from the land or from the atmosphere-must be defended by force when necessary. The
weapons used for this purpose are weapons to be
directed to the space objects, o~ satellites, of
aggressor states, and, accordingly, self defense
means the right to test, determine the reliability
and ensure the readiness of anti-satellite weapons,
and, when necessary to use them to counter an
armed attack. This entire framework is preserved
in outer space, because the outer space treaties
have incorporated without affecting this development the United Nations Charter. To prohibit such
weapons for such purposes would be tantamount to
withholding a claim to self defense, and, more
particularly, to amending the United Nations
Charter, or rendering it inapplicable in outer
space.

The two distinct, yet interacting, objectives
of the United Nations Charter echo the concerns
set forth in the excerpt just cited from the
Scowcroft report. The Charter--in the preambles
and in its purposes, and in such operative provisions as Articles 55 and 56--makes clear that the
United Nations would be meaningless if states were
not dedicated both to optimizing the claims for
human rights of their citizens, and to maintaining
for them, internally, and externally international
peace and security.
The practice of states amply reveals that
simply prescribing "guarantees" of human rights
is also meaningless, unless the individual is
given effective processes and procedures for
remedy and correction against the abuses of
officials. The far-reaching principles embraced
in "due process of law" commencing in England
before articulation in the Magna Carta, but
clearly signalled in ancient Greece have now been
promoted in the important basket of the Helsinki
Accords. 4 These differences identified in the
Scowcroft report are differences that are fundamental in the perspectives of the totalitarian
states and the Western democracies.

Perceived in this way, the relations of
states in outer space are an extrapolation without
substantial change of their terrestrial relations.
The United Nations Charter and international law
applicable in general are applicable to those relations and to their activities in outer space.

Moreover, the Scowcroft Report points out
that the threat is not simply the threat of nuclear
weapons nor of modern weapons technology. The
threat that all states face comes from the unleashed
violence of warfare and aggression. Nuclear weapons exist, hence there is the danger they might be
used. But conventional warfare, destructive in
its own right, can lead to nuclear warfare:

III
Jurists are concerned with the value demands
that are established among peoples and states and
affecting their behavior, as well as with their
expectations regarding violence, because these are
interrelated. Western commnetators have symbolized
the greater reach of western values as the values
among its peoples and that these are turned toward
optimizing the public orders that promote human
dignity. A distinguished panel concerned with
balancing out the weaponry and the potential for
nuclear war referred to as the Scowcroft Commission
(i.e., named for the Chairman, Brent Scowcroft),
identifies the concerns of the Western nations with
the impacts of those social orders that would impair or jeopardize these values:

There can be no doubt that the very
scope of the possible tragedy of
modern nuclear war, and the increased destruction made possible
even by modern nonnuclear technology,
have changed the nature of war itself. This is not only because
massive conventional war with modern
weapons could be horrendously
destructive--some fifth million
people died in 'conventional'
World War II before the advent of
nuclear weapons--but also because
conventional war between the world's
major power blocs is the most likely
way for nuclear war to develop. The
problem of deterring the threat of
nuclear war, in short, cannot be
isolated from the overall power
balance between East and West.
Simply put, it is war that must
concern us, not nuclear war alone. 5

The members of the Commission
fully understand not only the
purposes for which this nation
(the United States) maintains
its deterrent, but also the
devastating mnature of nuclear
warfare, should deterrence fail.
The Commission believes that
effective arms control is an
essential element in diminishing
the risk of nuclear war--while
preserving our liberties and
those of like-minded nations.
At the same time the Commission
is persuaded that as we consider
the threat of mass destruction we
must consider simultaneously the
threat of aggressive totalitarianism-our task as a nation cannot be
understood from a position of moral
neutrality toward the differences
between liberty and totalitarianism.
These differences proceed from conflicting views regarding the rights
of individuals and the nature of
society.3

These are perspectives, then, that embrace
the insistence that the value demands that have
so long been shaped in Western democracies, that
at a minimum such demands are those relating to
optimizing a public order of human dignity within
and among states, that arms control must during the
process of optimization of such a public order
ensure that no war between the "world's major
power blocs" breaks out, and that, to ensure this,
there be, by fair implication, optimizing efforts
and optimized communications processes among rivals
as well as among cooperative states.
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IV
The task of a scientific commentary is first of all to find,
by a critical analysis, the possible
meanings of the legal norm undergoing interpretation; and then to
show their consequences, leaving it
to the competent authorities to choose
from among the various possible interpretations the one which they, for
political reasons, consider to be
preferable, and which they alone
are entitled to select. A scientific interpretation has to avoid
giving countenance to the fiction
that there is always but a single
'correct' interpretation of the norms
to be applied to concrete cases.
This fiction, it is true, may have
some political advantages.

Professor Grigori Tunkin has been selected as
the leading Soviet jurist primarily to consider the
claims that he is making for international law and
to contrast those claims with those of Professor
Myres S. McDougal.
The comparisons that are made
here are designed, primarily, to draw upon those
claims that appear to be most representative of the
Soviet Union and of the Western democracies.
Accordingly, misperceptions in this analysis should
be considered as part of an on-going process of
clarification--and the correction and critique-that is associated with the development of any
science.
Perhaps the two fundamental principles of
Professor Tunkin relate to those of "consent" and
to "peaceful coexistence.,,6 While the policy implications of these principles, and the impacts
of each of them on shaping a global community
policy will be considered more fully, the principle
of consent when related to international law, is
the policy of the right of a "sovereign" state to
determine when it will be legally bound by that
law. The far-reaching impact of this perspective
is seen when it is clear that consent applies to
customary international law as well as treaty law.
Moreover, Professor Tunkin argues that it is a
principle that is shared by the emerging nations-because they cannot be compelled to accept the
traditional law that developed among the capitalist
nations--and by the Soviet Union, because it is
driving toward the development of new legal principles more realistically identified and validated
by the global social order.

The deeper implications of Kelsen's observations
have been suggested in this paper--particularly
with respect to states making their claims and
counterclaims, in cases such as these, over the
meaning of legal norms, and more particularly with
respect to fixed outcomes of a given methodology of
interpretation.
In order to assure that no confusion is attached to this principle, the following citation*
is invoked at length:
[88-89]
This conception is in crying contradiction with the basic generally recognized principles of modern
international law, the principle of
equality of states, in particular.

Professor Tunkin in appraising Article 38(b)
of the International Court of Justice declares that
"it {.;ould be more accurate" to use the words "recognized as an international legal norm" instead of
"accepted as law." Article 38(b) states:

It is beyond dispute that equality of
states signifies only juridical
equality, which may not accord with
the actual inequality of states in
international relations. There is
a certain contradiction here between
the real relations and juridical
relations. No doubt the position
of the majority of states, the Great
Powers in the first place, is of
decisive significance in the creation
of generally accepted norms of international law are equivalent to each
other. This juridical equality is of
great importance.
It means that in
international relations no group of
states, not even in majority of
states, can create norms binding
upon other states, or has the
right to attempt to impose these
norms upon other states.

[Article 38 a.b] The Court,
whose function is to decide in
accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
b. international custom, as
evidence of a general
practice accepted as law.
He then adduces from this argument and the
more "accurate" rendition that the principle of
consent is applicable to customary international
law. But read in the context of the entire provision, Western scholars, and Western practice,
treat the provision differently.
It is a provision
in which custom itself is identified as "evidence"
of a general practice among states accepted as law.
The final phrase of Art. 38(b)(1) relates to the
end-product of a process--the outcome in which law
emerges from custom and usage. The differing perspectives identified by Professor McDougal appears
later in this paper.

Customary norms of international law
being a result of agreement among
states, the sphere of action of such
norms is limited to the relations
between the states which accepted
these norms as norms of international
law, i.e., the states participating
in this tacit agreement.

Clearly, however, we are facing differing
interpretations and differing recommendations by
jurists to policy-makers. As to these, Hans
Kelsen declared in his THE LAW OF THE UNITED
NATIONS [New York, 1950, p. xvi]:

*From Tunkin
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The sphere of action of a customary
principle or customary norm of
international law may gradually expand. This, as a rule, is the way
customary norms of international
law become generally recognized
norms. There are several cases of
he declaration of a single state
becoming a point of departure.
Many principles of international law
were proclaimed, for instance, by
revolutionary France in the 18th
century. Among them were the principles of respect of state sovereignty, noninterference in the internal
affairs of another state, equality
of states, and the principle that
war operations must be directed
against military objects only and
cannot be directed against the
civilian population. The Soviet
state has advanced the principle of
banning aggressive wars and treating
such wars as crimes, the principle
of self-determination of nations,
the principle of peaceful coexistence, and a number of other
principles of international law.
In all these cases, the principles
originally proclaimed by a single
state were gradually recognized by
other states and have become, partly
by custom and partly by treaty,
generally recognized principles
of modern international law.

In practically all cases when it is
necessary to establish the existence
of one or another generally recognized norm of international law, the
usual procedure is to investigate if
"universal practice" exists; and in
case such practice does exist, if it
has been recognized a s a norm of law,
and how many states have recognized
such practice as a norm of law.
Because of the importance of the impact of
this principle, further citations from Professor
Tunkin are needed to establish its reach.
Analyzing the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, he states in his text, THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, at pages 123-125:
(2) A customary norm as the result
and embodiment bf tacit consent. The
operative sphere bf a customary norm.
What is recognition by states of a
specific rule as a norm of international law? What is the essence
of such recognition? Recognition
or acceptance by a state of a particular customary rule as a norm of law
signifies an expression of a state's
will, the consent of a state, to
consider this customary rule to be a
norm of international law. It must
be emphasized that one is speaking of
recognition "as a norm of international
law" and not "as a legal norm" the
norms of national legal systems of
other states. Moreover, courts of
states frequently apply norms of
foreign law.

This proposition about the spheres
of influence of customary norms is
of special significance to modern
international law, which regulates
the relations between states
belonging to two opposed social
systems. Only a customary rule
which is recognized by the states
of both systems can now be regarded
as a customary norm of international
law.

But the Statute of the International
Court refers to recognition of a
particular rule as an international
legal norm or, more precisely, of a
norm of general international law.
The Statute speaks of "general
practice," "accepted as law"; that
is, local customary international
legal norms are pushed to the side.
Such norms exist, although they do
not play a large role in the general
system of international law.

The concept that customary norms of
international law recognized as
such by a large number of states are
binding upon all states not only has no
foundation in modern international law
but it fraught with grave danger. This
concept in essence justifies the attempts
made by one group of states to impose
upon other states, the socialist
states, for instance, or the newly
emerging states of Asia and Africa,
certain customary norms which, while
regarded perhaps by this group of
states as customary norms of international law, have never been accepted
by the new states and which may prove
partly or wholly unacceptable to these
new states. Obviously, this tendency
to dictate norms of international
law to other states is, under present
conditions, doomed to failure. But
it is no less obvious that such attempts
at dictation may lead to grave international complications.

Thus, the bonds between a state
accepting a customary norm of international law and the other states
who already have recognized this norm
are basically identical with those
bonds establihsed among states with
the aid of an international treaty.
Consequently, the essence of the
process of creating a norm of international law by means of custom consists of agreement between states,
which in this case is tacit, and not
clearly expressed, as in a treaty.
If a customary norm of international
law is the result of agreement between
states, the operative sphere of this
norm is limited to relations between
states who have recognized it as a
norm of international law, that is to
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to relations between those states
who are parties to the corresponding
tacit agreement.

be "recognized" by the Soviet Union, in particular
in those situations where it determines that it is
not legally bound; (b) international treaty law
operates most explicitly through an instrument
clearly evidencing the consent of the Soviet Union,
but even here that consent will depend upon what
the Soviet Union perceives as the legally binding
obligations established by the operative provisions of the agreement, and, in the event of dispute, will depend during negotiations for settlement or adjustment, upon its perception of how far
its consent has extended.

The operative sphere of a principle
or customary norm of international
law may gradually expand, and it is
by this means, as a rule, that
customary norms of international
law become generally recognized.
There are frequent instances when
the declaration of a single state
is a formative moment. Many principles of international law were
proclaimed, for example, by revolutionary France in the eighteenth
century. Among them are the
principles of respect for state
sovereignty, noninterference,
equality of states, and the principle
that military operations must be
directed only against military objects and not against the civilian
population, and others. In the
Decree on Peace and other state
documents, the Soviet state advanced
the principles of the prohibition
and criminality of aggressive war,
the principle of self-determination
of nations, the principle of peaceful coexistence, and a number of
other principles of international
law.

Professor Tunkin enlarges upon the interaction of treaty law and customary international
law, building however upon the full thrust of his
notion of the principle of consent: First, it
must be clarified that he is concerned with norms
of international law--i.e., with the black-letter
type rule, and not with law that falls short of a
"norm" or general rule Tl42):
International treaty and international
custom are the two methods of
creating norms of general international law. The essence of these
methods lies in agreement between
states as regards recognition of a
specific rule as a norm of international law •.•. In principle it is
possible to change a customary norm
by means of treaty and a treaty norm
by means of custom.

One should not forget, however, the
specific feature of international law
that subjects of international are
themselves the creators of norms
of international law. The fact
that states are bound by prevailing
norms of international law does not
preclude the possibility of their
creating new norms of international
law by treaty of custom that may
differ from prevailing norms. With
regard to norms of international
law which are not of an imperative
character, the question is resolved
relatively simply.

While treaty law is readily to be found,
modifying customary international law, according
to Professor Tunkin, the modification of treaties
through customary international law--following
the report of the International Law Commission
[1964], and in particular the impact of subse,quent practice of states--clarified by the
Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thailand) [Merits, Judgment of
15 June 1962]--must evidence the consent of
the parties, that is, all of the parties:
The Commission ~nternational Law
Commission] was far from thinking
that any practice might modify
the provisions of a treaty. The
Commissions's draft contains two
essential elements. Practice must
testify to an agreement of the
parties to modify a provision of the
treaty. As the Commission points out
in the commentary to this article,
"in formulating the rule in this
way the Commission intended to indicate that the subsequent practice
even if every party might not itself
have actively participated in the
practice, must be such as to
establish the agreement of the
parties as a whole to the modification in question."
~itations in
the text].[145-6]

A new norm deviating from a prevailing
norm (and, consequently, recognized
by the respective powers) will, of
course be binding only upon states
which have recognized it, and this
new norm replaces the respective old
norm in relations among these
countries. The latter, however,
will be operative among states which
still have not recognized the new
norm gradually may be expanded at
the expense of reducing the operative
sphere of the old norm, and ultimately
the new norm may completely supplant
the old norm.
Assuming that the principle of consent had
been adopted by the Soviet Union as one of the
fundamental principles of international law, this
would mean or imply several policy features:
(a) international customary law that Western
states invoke or rely upon as the legitimatizing
or legalizing basis establishing what is permissible or impermissible will not necessarily

The "regulations" of international organizations may also be accepted as international law-the determining factor however is that of consent,
and the the regulations are characterized "in
essence" as "international treaties." [106].
However, the treaties of international
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organizations are "always of a secondary nature,"
i.e., "treaties of international organizations, in
contrast to treaties between states, contain, at
the present time at least, only local norms."
[ 113]

structure and Marxist-Leninist ideology.
Various forms of state unions of
socialist states are possible on the
path to a classless, stateless communist society. The creation of a
world federation or another form of
uniting free states and nations is
conceivable, therefore, only on the
path of liquidating private ownership,
exploitation, class and national
contradictions, on the path of
constructing socialism and communism.

The consensual principle, coupled with the
Marxist-Leninist perspective, compels Professor
Tunkin to reject a global social and global legal
order unless it is based upon !he comin$ together
of the classless society. In accepting a "world
state," he first declares that as states proceed
to "socialism," they must over time cast aside
the "deep roots of national discord and economic,
political and cultural inequality," then
observes [374]:

While the principles of consent and peaceful
coexistence are the fundamental pillars in
Professor Tunkin's framework of positive international law, a further dimension appears in his
interpretation of the policy content of the United
Nations Charter--i.e., the Charter itself entails
the principle of peaceful coexistence p. 71-72]:

It is necessary to point out that
the view, widely held in the West,
that the Soviet Union and Soviet
jurists oppose a world state, oppose
an effective international organization, while western countries and
western jurists favor a world state
in principle and therefore an
effective international organization, is completely unjustified.

The experience of states of the two
systems R.e., socialist and
capitalist] and, especially, the
cooperation of these states during
the Second Wrold War led to the
principle of peaceful coexistence
being placed at the base of the
United Nations Organization .•.•
Although the term "peaceful
coexistence" is not used in the
Charter, the principle of peaceful
coexistence runs throughout the
Charter of this international
organization. The preamble of the
Charter speaks of the determination
"to save succeeding generations from
the scourge of war," "to establish
conditions under which justice and
respect for the obligations arising
from treaties and other sources of
international law can be maintained."
States are called upon "to practice
tolerance and live together in peace
with one another as good neighbors."
[Article 1, further, sets forth the
elements of peaceful coexistance].
Finally, the United Nations Charter
says that this international organization must be "a centre for harmonizing
the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends," having in
view, naturally, the harmonized actions
of states of different social systems.
The inclusion of the principle of
peaceful coexistence in the United
Nations Charter was a decisive state
in the process of transforming this
principle into a generally recognized
principle of international law.

Marxism-Leninism links the
possibility of a world association
of nations first and foremost with
the liquidation of capitalism as
the last exploitative socioeconomic formation and with the
creation of a socialist society.
"The purpose of socialism," wrote
V.I. Lenin, "is not only to
eliminate the splintering of mankind into petty states and any
isolation of nations; is not
only the rapprochement of nations
but also their amalgamation."
But in order to create the conditions for this, more than just
the liquidation of private ownership and the creation of a
socialist state is needed. Lenin
pointed out that national and
state differences among peoples
and countries will last "for a very,
very long time even after realization of the dictatorship of the
proletariat on a world-wide scale."
Even on the domestic plane in a
number of instances socialism inherits
from capitalism such deep roots of
national discord and economic, liqudate them. In international relations,
naturally, the matter is far more
complex. Each state represents both
a political and an economic unit.
With the various historical strata
of contradictions between states
and between nationalities are
associated a number of econimic,
political, cultural, and other
problems.

For the detached observer, the policies supported by Professor Tunkin have the same force as
the veto power that can be exercised in the
Security Council of the United Nations. The overall thrust of this perspective is of course consistent with the fundamental principles of MarxistLeninist framework for the Soviet Union itself--so
that the "logic"of the framework is simply the
outcome of Soviet perspectives (assuming again that
Professor Tunkin correctly declares what these are
in his text) regarding its own social order.

Within the framework of the world
socialist system, however, these
differences and contradictions
gradually are being overcome on
the basis of a new socialist social
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The other fundamental principle is that of
peaceful coexistence. This principle is identified as one that has "been further developed in
documents of the Communist party of the Soviet
Union and of the Soviet government, in the practicpl policy of the Soviet state" (35). More
specifically, the principle embraces a number of
principles, described, and cited in, the Program
of the Party, because it:

cultural cooperation on the basis
of complete equality and mutual
advantage.
Peaceful coexistence is not some
sort of idealist concept, divorced
from reality; it reflects the laws
of relations among socialist and
capitalist states.

presupposes: renunciation of
war as a means of deciding
questions in dispute among states,
settling them by negotiations;
equality, mutual understanding,
and trust among states, having
regard to each other's interests;
noninterference in internal
affairs, recognizing for every
people the right independently
to decide all questions of their
own country; strict respect for
the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of all countries; the
development of economic and
cultural cooperation on the basis
of complete equality and mutual
advantage. 05-36)

Relations among states always have
been characterized by w struggle
among them. The roots of this
struggle, which had a varying degree
of intensity, are found in the class
contradictions of society.
The concept of peaceful coexistence
is based on and reflects this law.
"Peaceful coexistence," says the
Program of the CPSU, "serves as
the basis of peaceful competition
between socialism and capitalism
on an international scale and is a
specific form of class struggle
between them."
Of course, states, not classes, enter
into international relations; international relations are relations
among states. But the foreign
policy of states is determined by
the predominant classes in these
states; this is class policy.
Therefore, the struggle of the
two systems, socialist and capitalist,
affects relations among socialist
and capitalist states.

Peaceful coexistence, in its more specific
context, embraces the following:
(a) realistic
perception that there is a "struggle" to be
maintained as ideological or as opposing value
struggle between the socialist and capitqlist
social orders; (b) full support iNr-"'/~,nnilitary
suppor~ and assistance to liberation movements
involv~ in wars of liberation against the
capitalist social orders; (c) identification of all
liberation struggles and those of the socialist
states as "just wars;" and (d) the ultimate realization of the Marxist-Leninist goal in which the
claims to private property and the existence of
social orders based upon classes, with their
inevitable class struggle, will disappear with the
rise of the socialist commonwealth of states.
Professor Tunkin declares in the following
passage [35-37):

Thus, the specific feature of this
"class struggle" consists, first
and foremost, in the fact that this
struggle manifests itself in relations
among states, and not directly between
classes.
At the same time, the concept of
peaceful coexistence does not
allow every means of struggle
among states; it precludes armed
struggle and permits only peaceful
competition among them. Consequently, reflecting the true
inevitability of struggle among
states of the two systems, the
concept of peaceful coexistence
includes this struggle. But
struggle does not preclude cooperation. In reality, struggle and
cooperation exist simultaneously
in relations among states of the
two systems and in international
relations in general; cooperation
has been permeated by struggle.
The intensity of struggle and the
degree of cooperation differ in
relations among various and
between one and the same states
on various questions and at various
times.

The Leninist teaching on the
peaceful coexistence of socialist
and capitalist states has been
further developed in documents
of the Communist party of the
Soviet Union and of the Soviet
government, in the practical policy
of the Soviet state. A detailed
characterization of peaceful
coexistence has been given in the
Program of the CPSU. "Peaceful
coexistence," says the Program of
the CPSU, "presupposes: renunciation of war as a means of deciding
questions in dispute among states,
settling them by negotiations;
equality, mutual understanding, and
trust among states, having regard
to each other's interests; noninterference in internal affairs, recognizing
for every people the right independently to decide all questions of their
own country; strict respect for
the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of all countries; the
development of economic and

In defining the position of the CPSU
on this question, the Secretary
General of the Central Committee
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of the CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev,
stated in one of his recent
speeches: "The CPSU has proceeded and is proceeding from
the fact that class struggle of
the two systems--capitalist and
socialist--in the sphere of
economics, politics, and, of
course, ideology will continue.
It could not be otherwise, for
the world view and class
objectives of socialism and
capitalism are opposed and irreconcilable. But we shall
strive so that this historically inevitable struggle follows
a course not threatened by wars
dangerous conflicts, or an uncontrolled arms race. This will
be an enormous gain for the cause
of peace throughout the world and
for the interests of all peoples
and all states ••

base.

[22-23)

In short, Professor Tunkin's perspectives
draw upon policy content--but that policy content
and its context are limited to those of MarxistLeninist, and to the inevitable suppression of
capitalism and imperialism in the "struggle"
between the two social systems. The invocation of
a global public or legal order would be meaningless
under these perspectives if that order were to entail capitalist or democratic value demands of the
capitalist systems. And most fundamental are the
two principles of consent with regard to what law
shall be binding and peaceful coexistence, operating together to legitimatize the Soviet policy
goals that are associated with supporting its own
policies under Marxist Leninism.
Professor Tunkin claims that through
Marxist-Leninist framework he is afforded the only
theory that "allows us to explain scientifically
both the existence of contemporary general international law and its social nature." This theory
shows that such law develops "on the basis of the
general tenets of historical materialism." In
summary:

The far-reaching implications of this principle of peaceful coexistence will be appreciated
only as the "correlation of forces in the world
arena" (42) strengthen the socialist community.
During this period the transition in policy sense
from capitalism and socialism will take place
~l), and the capitalist system--identified by
Professor Tunkin as states "whose social system
is characterized by the existence of private
ownership and of the means of production and the
exploitqtion of man by man" (36) ,--will be
replaced by a socialist social order. The principle of peaceful coexistence presupposes, building
upon the principle of consent discussed earlier,
that the capitalist and socialist states can
enter into international agreements. But it is
clearly implied in the context of Professor
Tunkin's text that these international agreements
must serve the socialist--i.e., Marxist-Leninist-goals, tactics or strategies or they would by
definition be unacceptable to the socialist
states.

International law, just as law
in general, is a category of the
superstructure. Therefore, the
general law of the development of
human society having the closest
relationship to international law
is the law of the dependence of
the social structure on the base;
that is, the economic structure of
society. (234)
Applying the policies of Marxist-Leninism,
with their impact on law and upon policy in
general, and their larger impact upon the inevitable
development of the social orders within and among
states, Professor Tunkin claims that the forces
within the socialist states have a monopoly on
promoting peace, because:
..the principal factor in
increasing the effectiveness
of the United Nations as an
instrument of peace and international cooperation is the
forces which could exert
pressure upon the ruling
classes and the governments
of states whose policy does
not correspond to the interests
of peace and consequently the
requirements of the United
Nations Charter. There are
such forces in modern society;
these are the forces of peace.

The full policy impact of the principle
appears in the following statement in which peaceful coexistence is said to be unable to embrace
policies that oppose communism--and in the context
in which the statement appears--Marxist-Leninism,
and its value demands:
The concept that during the past
fifty years the developmental
base of general international
law has contracted in consequences
of the existence of states of two
opposed social systems and opposed
ideologies, as well as the emergence
of a large numberof new states whose
cultural heritage is substantailly
different from western civilization,
is widely disseminated in the
bourgeois doctrine of international
law. Politically, this concept
reflects first and foremost the
influence of the policy of anticommunism, which rejects peaceful
coexistence of states with opposed
social systems and the possibility
of agreement between them. Bourgeois
legal doctrine is its theoretical

(380)

Of course, the Western scholar is certain to
find these perspectives ambiguous, assertive and
inconsistent with his own. But he may, like
Professor Myres S. McDougal find that they are
tendentious
promoting the policies of one state,
and insisting that those policies for the purposes
of that state and in general must be established.
The fundamental policy in Professor McDougal's
approach is to seek the optimization of human
dignity, within social orders and among them. This
is consistent with the Western tradition of
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democratic orders and processes.

to be put into controlling
practice, that, we suggest, are
in any community most appropriately
regarded as law.

Law--both municipal and international law--has
always been policy oriented, but the policies of
law are often frozen, from the policies and conditions affecting those policies, when the law was
first crystalized into norm, rule or standard.
Moreover, legal policy has tended to be identified
with legalistic policy--with policy that is limited
to promoting the limited perspectives of a rigid
legal order and legal process. In modern times,
however, the policies of public law have shifted
so that they embrace the larger decision flow of
states and their governments, but are distinguished from that flow by the authority associated
with iegal decisions, by their controlling effect
on the decisions, and by their policy content.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, a noted American jurist,
declared: 7

A careful examination of the comprehensive process of authoritative
decision within any particular community will reveal that this process,
also, is made up of two different
kinds of decisions. There are the
decisions that establish and maintain
the process of authoritative decision
and there are the decisions made by
this process in controlling and regulating the different value processes
within the community. Decisions of
the first type identify and characterize authoritative decision-makers,
state and specifiy basic community
policies, establish appropriate
structures of authority, allocate
bases of power for sanctioning purposes, authorize procedures for the
making of different kinds of decisions,
and secure the performance of all the
various kinds of decisions (intelligence, promoting, prescription,
invocation, application, termination
and appraisal) necess8TY to the
effective administration of community
policies. These are the decisions
that we label "constitutive," with
reference obviously somewhat broader
than the more traditional word
"constitutional." The second kind
of decision, which for convenience,
we may call "public order," emerging
in continuous flow from constitutive
process, are those that determine how
wealth is produced and distributed,
how human rights are promoted and
protected, or not protected from
deprivation, how enlightenment is
encouraged or blighted, how health
is fostered or neglected, how
rectitude and civic responsibility
are matured or repressed, and so on
through the whole gamut of community
values. Any comprehensive inquiry
about the law, past or future, of
a community must accordingly take
into account the entire flow within
that community of both constitutive
and public order decisions.

It is revolting to have no
better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down
in the time of Henry IV. It is
still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid
down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past.
The policy framework of Professor McDougal is
best expressed by the following:
It is easiest to understand
international law by recalling
our notions of law in any
community. It has already been
suggested that, . • . , law is best
regarded as a process of authoritative decision in which the members
of a community collectively-through the careful articulation
of shared demands and expectations
and the employment of many different
institutions and intellectual
procedures--seek to clarify and
secure their common interests.
By a community we make reference
to any territorial grouping within
which the members are constrained by
interdeterminations or interdependencies in the shaping and sharing
of values. In any particular community there can be observed, among
its value processes, a process of
effective power in the sense that
decisions are made and enforced, by
severe deprivations or high indulgences, irrespective of the immediate wishes of the targets of
decision. Upon close exmaination
these effective power decisions may
be observed to be of two different
kinds: first, those that are taken
by sheer naked power or calculations
of expediency; and second, those
that are made in accordance with
community expectations about how, and
with what content, they should be
made. It is these latter authoritative
decisions, those made in accordance
with community expectation and
disposing of enough effective power

A policy-oriented framework of inquiry
has, thus, no difficulty in observing,
as we have already in some measure
documented, that humankind does today
constitute a global or earth-space
community, entirely comparable to
its internal component communities,
in the sense of interdetermination
and interdependences in the shaping
and sharing of values. It is the
larger community process, composed
of many different and interpenetrating lesser community processes,
which stimulates claims to authoritative decision, affects the process of
decision, and is in turn affected by
decision. It is, hence, indispensable
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to effective inquiry to have
a realistic map or model of
the larger global process.

in self-defense, or two classes
of war, each certain that it
speakes for the common interest.
They live, we are likely to say,
in different worlds. More
accurately, they live in the
same world, but they think and
feel in different ones. It is to
these special worlds, it is to
these private, or group, or class,
or provincial, or occupation, or
sectarian artifacts, that the
political adjustment of mankind in
the great society takes place.

For the relations among states, this policy
framework is perceived against the competitive
social and power processes, because, perceived
realistically, states in tbeir practice are found
to seek influence, prestige, respect, and to
secure these through power and through values that
support either their acquisition of power, or
their denial of power to others. As with
Professor Tunkin, change is accommodated in this
approach. Professors Lasswell and Kaplan declared, for example: 9

How do states behave in a competitive power
process? Because they are seeking power, how do
they seek to acquire that power? What appeals are
drawn to common goals--of mutual security, of
global order, of the maintenance of international
peace and security? Professor McDougal extends his
inquiry beyond the traditional law into the
strategic instruments of policy--into those that
are ideological, economic, and diplomatic as well
as military. A variety of changing strategies is
examined and the connection of these policyoriented activities with the emergence of with
the choices that are made to shaping law are
identified. Such strategies--and the choices
involved--may extend to the negotiation and conclusion of international treaties and agreements,
but then they may also be extended to the actions,
policies and decisions relating to the kind of
customary international law that is expected or
identified with the larger goals of community
policy.

The experiential data of political science.are acts.considered
as affecting or determinin~ other
acts, a relation embodied in the
key concept ·of power. Political
science, as an empirical discipline
is the study of the shaping and
sharing of power.
This empirical grounding of
political abstractions may be
expressed by formulating the subject matter of political science
in terms of a certain class of
events (including "subjective"
events), rather than timeless
institutions or political patterns.
We deal with power as a process in
time, constituted by experientially
localized and observable acts.
Both structures and functions are
construed as abstractions from
what is empirically given as
process. This orientation in
political inquiry may be designated the principle of temporality.

Analysis and inquiry into these larger and
enveloping processes demand a comprehensive framework that enables the scholar to perceive and to
follow the development of law itself, to see its
limitations, particularly when expressed against
the policy goals expected from law, and to provide
the decision and policy-maker with alternatives,
choices or modifications to his own. The norms
of international law--Iargely prescriptive in
nature when we look to global processes--are in
place, but for the purposes of effective regulation of the use of force there is missing the
institutional and procedural framework, as the
followiyg excerpt of Professor McDougal makes
clear: l

The principle of temporality does
not imply a concern with only
changes in situations rather than
with states of affairs. Inquiry
deals with both sorts of problems
and may be designated as equilibrium or developmental analysis
accordingly.
Some resemblance to one aspect of the principle of peaceful coexistence appears in this
perspective, because while that principle is
directed to a pre-ordained outcome, it must deal
with adjustments between nations with differing
perspectives. However, while the theory of
Professor Tunkin presupposes the pre-ordained
outcome, the theory of Professor McDougal and
others presupposes only that adjustment itself
may be the outcome, and will be a prolonged
process at least as long as nations do not
destroy each other and the earth itself. To
this end the publicist Walter Lippmann noted: lO

The public order established and
maintained by global constitutive
process could be described in terms
of the protection afforded and
regulation achieved by authoritative decision with respect to every
feature of global social process.
The trend would appear, again,
toward a slow improvement in an
emerging global society, though a
society not as well managed, or as
secure, as the society achieved in
more mature national communities.
The most comprehensive description
would make reference to the degree
to which the different participants
in global social process are protected
in the establishment and maintenance
of their own internal constitutive
and public order processes and in

When full allowance has been
made for deliberate fraud,
political science has still to
account for such facts as two
nations attacking one another,
each convinced that it is acting
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.different features of interaction.

their interactions with other
participants; the extent to
which appropriate situations
of interaction in all the
different value processes are
maintained about the world:
the modalities by which the
different resources comprising
the physical environment--Iand
masses, rivers, oceans, air space,
outer space, atmosphere, and so
on--are allocated for inclusive
and exclusive uses and how these
uses are regulated and protected;
the degree of 9uccess achieved
in facilitating persuasive, and
in restraining and minimizing
coercive, employment of the various
strategies (diplomatic, ideological, economic, and military)
in the shaping and sharing of
values; and, finally and most
importantly, the degree to which
demanded outcomes in the different value processes (wealth,
resepct, enlightenment, and so
on) are in fact achieved and
protected. It is possible
here only to make brief and suggestive indication of the kind
of detail that would be relevant
in such comprehensive inquiry.

The obvious Achilles heel in
global public order is in the
failure of constitutive process
to establish enough effective
control over the different nation-states to preclude resort
to unauthorized coercion and
violence. The number one problem
of humankind remains, as we have
indicated above, that of security
in the sense of establishing a
minimum order, in control of unauthorized coercion and violence,
which will permit more effective
pursuit of an optimum order in
maximization of the shaping and
sharing of all values. Through
articles 2(4) and 51 of the United
Nations Charter, and many ancillary
prescriptions, the global community
has at long last achieved a workable distinction between impermissible and permissible coercion,
admitting of application in particular instances in support of
minimum order. It remains, however,
for the community to establish an
appropriate institutional framework
both for disinterested, third-party
appraisal of particular instances
of alleged impermissible coercion
and for the application of appropriate sanctioning measures in
preventing and deterring coercion
and in restoring and rehabilitating
public order. Though contemporary
nation-states receive tremendous
benefits from constitutive process,
they have as yet been only imperfectly
subjected to its complementary
burdens.

The protection accorded the
nation-state in global social
process is, for quick illustration, the principle subject matter
of traditional conceptions of international law. It is the global
constitutive process that identifies
which territorial entities are to
be regarded as "nation-states" and
establishes their "legal personality"
in process of authoritative decision,
specifies what purposes are permissible to these entities in their
interactions with other such
entities and lesser participants,
indicates the structures of
authority (internal constitutive
processes) required of a nationstate for effective participation
in external affairs with other
states, regulates the acquisition of, and sharing in the enjoyment of, bases of power (resources,
people) by different nation-states,
seeks to control the exercise by
nation-states of the different
instruments of policy in both
persuasion and coercion, and,
finally, allocates among the
different nation-states the competences ("jurisdiction") to engage
in the various authority functions
(prescribing, applying, and so on)
in the making and application of law
to events in global social process.
In a vast and continuing flow of
decision, global constitutive process
establishes for any particular territorial community a modest but viable
security in relation to all these

Customary international law, in these perspectives, unlike those of Professor Tunkin, is
an enterprise related to the choices evidenced in
the behavior of states. Even if states are free
to act as they choose, or even if they insist
upon such freedom, they reveal what they believe
to be the legitimate or permissible way to act by
acting. The communications in this process
relating to custom, and ultimately to customary
international law, appear in the actions, but also
the accompanying statements, declarations, and
claims that they are making to each other.
Professor McDougal identifies the proc ss in which
customary international law develops:1 2
The technical requirements for
establishing a customary prescription in international law
are, despite some controversy
among the doctors, most frequently stated as embracing
"two essential elements":
a "material" element in certain
past uniformities in behavior
and a "psychological" element, or
opinio juris, in certain subjectives of "oughtness" attending the
uniformities in behavior. It is,
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nevertheless, easily observed,
and generally agreed, that both
these required elements admit
of flexible and many varying
interpretations. The relevant
uniformities in behavior may
include the acts and utterances
not only of officials, national
and international, located at
many different positions in
structures of authority, but
even of individuals and representatives of private associations and nongovernmental
pressure groups. Such acts
may also vary enormously in
the amount of repetition they
exhibit and in the duration of
time through which they occur.
The subjectivities of oughtness
required to attend such uniformities of behavior, which subjectivities may on occasion be
proved by mere reference to the
uniformities in behavior, may
relate to many different systems
of nroms, such as prior authority,
morality, natural law, reason, or
religion. The honoring in lawcreating consequences even of
subjectivities asserted in the
beginning in direct contravention
of prior authority in fact suggests
as we have intimated above, that
the only subjectivities required
are those merely of expectation of
future uniformities in decision,
whatever the accompanying norms
of justification. Similarly, the
factual or literary evidences to
which decision-makers are
authorized to resort for information about past behavior and
subjectivities embrace not merely
the familiar items of international
agreements, resolutions of international organizations, public
utterances by international and
national officials, diplomatic
correspondence and instructions,
the writings of publicists, and
so on, but also "every written
document, every record of act or
spoken word which presents an
authentic picture of the practice
of states in their international
dealings."

jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 2(7) of the
United Nations Charter.
The larger perspective entertained by
Professor McDougal leads to the growing web of
customary rTIternational law, ultimately denying
all states, large or small, the claim that it is
withholding consent to legal obligations. The
enveloping web is one that operates in a way
through "precedent," so that states become the
beneficiaries and also the subjects of their prior
decisions, actions and policies: they are not
free under this perspective to adopt one policy
today, and then later to repudiate it, if the
global community has been led to perceive the
actions of that states and others as actions and
decisions that must conform to law. They are
subject to trends in the decision flow--perhaps
a more precise perspective than that of precedents these they oppose if they refuse to be
a member of the global community. According to
Professor McDougal these trends enable us, inter
alia, to follow the development of law and
policy:l3
[Trend thinking] considers
the shape of things to come regardless of preference. His
goals clarified, a policy-maker
must orient himself correctly in
contemporary trends and future
probabilities. Concerned with
specific features of the future
that are ever emerging from the past,
he needs to be especially sensitive
to time, and to forecast with
reasonable accuracy passage from
one configuration of events to
the next. For this purpose
he must have at his disposal a
vast array of facts properly
organized and instantly accessible .... The results of trend
thinking must continually be
evaluated by the policy-maker in
the light of his goals; the task
is to think creatively about how
to alter, deter, or accelerate
probable trends in order to shape
the future closer to his desire.
But Professor Tunkin argues that the concept
of community is without foundation, and hence he
might insist that the growth of community, whose
law and policy are inconsistent with that
established under the tenets of Marxist-Leninism,
is illusory or at best transitory. At page 27
in his treatise, he points out that law--seemingly
the traditional law from the context of the
excerpt below--does not have its basis in
community:

Professor Tunkin, it will be recalled, built
his theory upon the consent of states. They
must consent to legally binding obligations.
They may also enjoy equality, sovereignty, independence, but each of these, in the legal
sense, falls under consent, and to a large
extent, consent may be implicitly related to
power. The consent of a smaller state to the
demands of a larger state may, in the appropriate
negotiations, be simply deference to the power
of the larger or more powerful nation. The same
possibility of deference or submission lies with
the deeper implications of equality and
sovereignty, or even with the right to enjoy
the freedom of unopposed domestic

The concept that the basis of law
is community, particularly a common ideology, is completely unfounded. Proponents of this
concept frequently point out
that in the absence of a specific
community between people, the
existence of law in general and of
international law in particular
is impossible. Of course, in
the absence of a specific
community between people, the
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existence of human society,
and consequently of law, is
inconceivable, but it still
does not follow that this
community is the reason for
the formation of law or is
reflected in law. The
history of human society
shows completely the
opposite: in a pre-class
society, where this community between people was
more significant, there
was no law: only with the
emergence of class contradictions, with the destruction
of the tribal community, does
law emerge.

which is characterized by the
divorcing of the superstructure
from the base. A state is
regarded as something that can
be reconstructed as a cardinal
form at the will of politicians
and jurists irrespective of the
economic structure of society.
The causes of war, whose liquidation is the leitmotif of all plans
for a world state, bourgeois
scholars misrepresent as state
sovereignty, whereas the very
existence of sovereign states is
a nature consequence of the
economic structure of society, and
both sovereignty and the state
will disappear only when this
structure is changed.

Law, including international
law, emerged not as a result
of an increase in community
among people, but as a result
of the division of society into
classes and the formation of
new class contradictions unknown to tribal society. International law, just as municipal
law, is a phenomenon peculiar to
a class society.

The deep roots of wars are found
in the economic system and in the
specific class structure of society
which it determines. Moreover,
bourgeois concepts of a world
state originate, and by their
class nature cannot but originate,
from the possibility of creating
a world state and liquidating wars
without affecting the economic
system of capitalism. [375]

The theoretical unfoundedness of
the concept of a common ideology
as a necessary condition for the
existence and development of international law does not make this
concept less dangerous.

Professor Tunkin believes that a world state
would oppose "social revolutions" because such
plans "are linked in imperialist ideology with
the struggle against social revolutions and the
national liberation movement." The proposals
for a world state, in short, are an ideological
strategy, misleading peoples "both on the internal
and international plane." On the one hand they
"parry the blow from the capitalist system,
alleging the roots of wars are not linked. On the
other, they undermine the very cause of peace
itself.~ [375-7].

While both Professor Tunkin and Professor
McDougal have identified the policy orientation of
law, and the policy projection inherent in the
legal process, it is evident from the materials
presented so far that what they expect from the
legal process varies substantially. Professor
Tunkin clearly espouses the policies of his
government and projects those policies into
international law. These are not policies that
are to be shared on the basis of compromise or
adjustment with the opposing, competing or
differing policies of the Western states. They
are, through the principle of peaceful coexistence,
policies to supplement those that are no longer
needed in the traditional international law as the
Marxist-Leninist structure for the allocation of
authority and competence emerges among states.
Moreover, there are no alternatives: while the
period of transition may be long, the ultimate
outcome is not in doubt.

Of course, the support of "social" revolutions
is not limited to Marx, nor to Marxist-Leninist
teachings, nor to the policies of the socialist
bloc. Thomas Jefferson supported such revolutions,
and, though some argue without evidence that he
would even have supported revolutions by violence,
his primary goal was to ensure that society itself
would be able to adjust. And he foresaw that the
progressive social orders would have provisions
and expectations for adjustment structured within
them, and the procedures and processes (e.g.,
voting, referendum, and so. on) to enable such
adjustment to proceed.

Global public order under the perspectives of
Professor Tunkin is one, then, that remains very
loose in its organizational features, because
there is no possibility for accommodation toward
a global order that embodies the economic perspectives of the capitalist states. The class
nature within those states are the "deep roots of
wars," according to Professor Tunkin:

Professor Tunkin, and other Soviet commentators, find ample provision for the subordinate
principles flowing from the principle of peaceful
coexistence in the United Nations Charter, and,
they have identified most of the purposes and
objectives of the Charter against the perspectives
of coexistence. But it is clear that the principle
extends deep into an on-going, future oriented
policy, to be aided, where appropriate, by deliberate actions and assistance. The declaration of
General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union before the
26th Congress unambiguously proclaims full support
against what must clearly be the Western world: 14

The theoretical unfoundedness
of bourgeois concepts and plans
to create a world state is
determined by the basic unfoundedness of bourgeois methodology,
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Comrades, declares Brezhnev, no
one should doubt that the CPSU
will continue to consistently
pursue a course aimed at the
development of cooperation
between the USSR and the
liberated countries and at
the consolidation of the alliance of world socialism
and the national liberation.

Systems of public order are embedded in a larger context of
world events which is the entire
social process of the globe.
We speak of "process" because
there is interaction, of "social
because living beings are the
active participants, of "world"
because the expanding circles of
interaction among men ultimately
reach the remotest inhabitants of
the globe •••• Within the vast social
process of man pursuing values
through institutions utilizing
resources, we are especially concerned with the characteristic
features of the power porcess •..
Within the decision-making process
our chief interest is in the legal
process, by which we mean the making
of authoritative and controlling
decisions. Authority is the structure of expectation concerning who,
with what qualifications and mode
of selection, is competent to make
decisions by what- criteria and what
procedures. By control we refer to
an effective voice in decision,
whether authorized or not. The
conjunction of common expectations
concerning authority with a high
degree of corroboration in actual
operation is what we understand by
law •.•• Within the distinctions thus
developed, we are able to clarify
what is meant by a system of public
order. The reference is to the
basic features of the social process
in a community--including both the
identity and preferred distribution
pattern of basic goal values, and
the implementing institutions--that
are accorded protection by the legal
process.

Moreover, there is no room for compromise
with regard to these perspectives. They are not
only irreconcilable according to Professor Tunkin
with those of the bourgeois states, but they are
inevitable, and must not be opposed, or there is
the possibility that peace itself will be endangered. Victor P. Karpov, while First
Secretary of the Embassy of the Soviet Union in
Washington, made this abundantly clear in summarizing his own essay, "The Soviet Concept of
Peaceful Coexistence and its Implications for
International Law,"lS
We are convinced that the
principle of peaceful coexistence should be the
basic of the whole structure
of contemporary international
law. Only if it is based on
the principle of peaceful coexistence can international
law best promote the cause of
peace and mutual understanding
between nations.
The perspectives of Professor McDougal reveal
instead how states are behaving in their relationships with each other under current circumstances.
They have at best a loosely organized community.
This community affords them minimum order and
security, and unless sustained, they will fall
back increasingly upon unilateral measures to
achieve order out of enveloping chaos and anarchy,
primarily through their own power, particularly
military power. However, the global community
at large has adopted norms--important to enough of
them to be projected as law regulating the primary
concern that they all share, i.e., law regulating
the use of force. Unquestionably, the effectiveness of this law is dependent upon enforcement.
But this is presently dependent primarily upon
the checks and balancing that arises in the deterrence equilibrium regarding the nuclear weapons.
Until an effective means to replace the checks
and balancing process appears, that process must
be nurtured to include the weapons emerging from
the advancing military technologies. Yet, it must
be stressed, the process of checks and balancing
is dependent almost entirely on the communications
involved in the threats and counterthreats to use
or at least to have available the very weapons
that are being checked. This, of course,
provides--and reflects--the ambiguous basis of
relations among states in their competitive power
process.

VI
Conclusions to an inquiry into perspectives
relating to regulating the use of force among
states are always, at best, tentative. Two
leading commentators have been chosen to review
the prominent perspectives of jurists that come
from the Soviet Union and the United States, and
it is obvious that such an inquiry can be at best
preliminary. But such an inquiry is fruitful
because it enables, through comparison, for an
approach to be made concerning theories about law,
the legal process, and the legal order. Moreover,
it is part of the larger process of clarification-a task that is imposed relentlessly upon the
detached scholarly observer if he is to seek and
make useful proposals for alternative policies and
decisions.
Professor Tunkin's principles that supplement
or are embraced by, the principle of peaceful coexistence provide his framework for regulating the
use of force--at least in normative or prescriptive
terms. While little emphasis is given to the
critical policy functions identified in the application, recommendations for modification and shaping,
appraisals, and even for the interpretation and
where appropriate the termination of the proposed

Emphasizing the shaping of global social
processes as a positive approach to this problem,
Professor McDougal draws attention to the interaction of decision, policy, law and enforcement in
the following excerpt l6 :
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norms, Professor Tunkin indicates the wider reach
in such principles as the principles of nonaggression [49 et seq.], peaceful settlement of
disputes [57 et seq.], self-determination of
peoples [60 et seq.], the principle of peaceful
coexistence itself [69 et seq.], disarmament
[75 et seq.], respect for human rights, [79 et
seq.], and prohibition of war propaganda [83 et
seq.], and includes the renunciation of the use
of force in the principle of nonaggression.

to those who professed a "higher law" in the
natural law, and earlier in the "divine law"
legitimatizing the absolute power of the
Medieval kings.
With the emerging minimum order for outer
space now in view, the other principles might
quickly be mentioned. The policy goals associated
with Professor Tunkin's principles would then need
attainment. For example, the principle of
disarmament would call for "general and complete
disarmament," replacing the arms control features
and deterrence equilibria that now characterize
the undertakings regarding outer space.
[75 et
seq.]. This would be closely associated with the
operation of nonaggression, but the principle, so
far, has not reached the stage where it can be
said to be "completely formulated."
[78 et seq.].
Accordingly, what is needed, presumably to fulfill
the principle in outer space is the conclusion of
"an international agreement" for disarmament at
least for outer space [78-79].

Clearly he intends that all of these principles are mutually supportipg and reinforcing
in their impact. But ~~principle of nonaggression, _ _ "emerged at fhst as the prohibition
of aggressive war, being transformed later into
the principle of the prohibition of the use or
threat of force." Treaties and international
agreements embodying this principle are traced
by Professor Tunkin, and the United Nations
Charter--Articles 2(4) and 2(3) in particular--is
marked as "an important new stage in the development of the principle of nonaggression." [52].

But, while disarmament has not become an
operative principle, at least through international agreement, the "obligation to strive for
disarmament by the conclusion of an international
agreement has special significance." [79 et seq .].

Yet Professor Tunkin's observations are
ambiguous in this important context. He
seemingly suggests that while international law
provides valuable norms and that such norms
appear to be the end product of its effort, it
leads toward the application of a higher principle of peaceful coexistence--operating directly
but not necessarily as law upon the relations
among states:

While Professor Tunkin--surely with all other
responsible commentators and jurists--is intent
upon the prohibition of war and the use of force
or threat of force inconsistent with Article 2(4)
of the United Nationsl Charter, he limits his goal
to the prohibition of "aggressive" war, opening the
possibility to the permissibility, and to the
standards for establisHing the permissibility of
those wars that are not "aggressive." (i.e.,
the wars of liberation, and the wars in which
socialist states are engaged in defending themselves against nonsocialist states). But for
jurists, his observations are limited to formulating
and seeking the wide recognition of legal norms,
even if they in themselves provide only limited
restraint:

Contemporary international law
prohibits states from resorting
to war against other states.
But this does not mean, of
course, that with the emergence
of the principle of nonaggression
international law as a system
of norms regulating specific
social relations has become
weaker. The international
legal prohibition of aggressive war undoubtedly was a step
forward on the path of transforming international law into
a more effective measures means
of securing peace, of developing
the peaceful coexistence of
states. A~ if with the prohibition of aggressive war international
law turned its face toward peace
for the first time in history,
then its role in securing peaceful
coexistence has grown and it consequently has become more
effective. [56]

Even though establishing a legal
norm which prohibits war does not
mean that war is eliminated, a
real diverse influence of the
norm upon the conduct of subjects of international law is
possible. The actual guarantees
of the effectiveness of an international legal norm may be legal
or nonlegal.
[77-8].
Professor Tuniin's framework and analysis
compels us to conclude that through the principles of consent and peaceful coexistence and
the methodologies of Marxist-Leninism, the Soviet
Union is afforded the legal basis and the policy
guidelines to pursue its own objectives--in short,
to achieve the goals that it associated with the
inevitagle outcome of a Marxist-Leninist methodology. Such an approach would turn the existing
treaties and international agreements into transitional structures, wherever those agreements, or
the law that is established under, and in
accordance with such agreements, are inconsistent
with Soviet goals assuming they are those proclaimed by Professor Tunkin. This of course does
not mean that current agreements are not validated
by the consent of the Soviet Union, but it does

The ambiguity in these observations arises
from the language used--perhaps through the translation itself--because, while it stresses the
principle of peaceful coexistence as operating to
assist policy during the transition presupposed
by Professor Tunkin from a global grouping of
states with capitalist and socialist systems to a
grouping of states entirely with socialist
or communist systems, it is also, subsequently
identified as a principle of international law.
In either event, the purpose is clear: the
principle of peaceful coexistence operates as the
"higher law," a kind of ground-norm for the
transition. In this sense, it bears resemblance
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mean that they are subjected to the continuation
of the consensual processes of that nation. It
may mean--but this is a question to be addressed
by Soviet colleagues in the effort to provide
further clarification--that the present treaty
structure will continue at least until the larger
setting among states--the adoption by the preponderance of states of socialism--has been attained.

formal doctrine, policy crystallizations of the past, and
who focus too sharply upon naked
force as sanction may conceal
from both themselves and others
the true nature of the decisionmaking process. It is not suggested that past authoritative
formulations of policy do not
greatly influence decisionmakers. ,Such formulations
play varying roles in the
perspectives of different
decision-makers to seek
guidance from the experience
of their predecessors. Decisionmaking is also forward-looking,
however, and decision-makers
respond in fact not alone to
prior prescriptions but to a
great many environmental and
predispositional variables,
including doctrines which
formulate the effects of alternative decisions upon the groups
which they represent or with
which they identify and which
state objectives and policies for
the future. The process of
decision-making is indeed, as
every lawyer knows, changing
facts and claims. A conception
of law which focuses upon doctrine to the exclusion of the
pattern of practices by which
it is given meaning and made
effective, is, therefore, not the
most conducive to understanding.
It may be emphasized, further,
that official decision-makers,
the people who have formal
authority and are expected to
make important decisions, mayor
may not make the decisions in fact.
Effective control over decisions
may be located in governmental
institutions, but it may also be
located in political parties or
pressure groups or private associations and the people exercising
control may rely for their power
not upon formal authority but
upon wealth, enlightenment,
respect or other values. Description which would concern itself with effects as well as with
myth must take into account this
structure of effective controls over
apparent governors. Formal authority
without effective control is illusion; effective control without
formal authority may be naked
force. A realistic conception of
law must, accordingly, conjoin
formal authority and effective
control and include not only
doctrine but also the pattern of
practices of both formal and
effective decision-makers. A
democratic conception of law may
also include, to add brief detail,
a commitment to change by peaceful
procedures and to policies which

These are perspectives that when examined
against those of the West leave the outcome in
ambiguity, because the Soviet Union would be compelled through its practice, and through future
negotiations, and future treaties, to achieve the
goals that Professor Tunkin sets forth. This
would mean that the perspectives relating to the
regulation of territorial air space by legal
processes in the Soviet Union are expected to
become the perspectives for regulating outer
space. In particular, it means that the principles for assuring minimum order in outer space
will be identified, at least by scholars who are
adopting the views of Professor Tunkin, with the
effective application first of the principle of
peaceful coexistence. Ultimately, minimum order
is assured only with the completion of the
transition period when we will then perceive the
disappearance of the capitalist state, the
capitalist approach and the bourgeois methodologies and approaches to law that are inconsistent
with these far-reaching structural changes.
While these perspectives follow a preordained path, the "bourge~is methodology" of
Professor McDougal sugges~ instead, that law
and its authority and controlling effects will
gradually develop and emerge with the widening
participation of those involved in the lawprojecting processes. Professor McDougal
emphasizing that we must displace doctrine,
states: l7
Sanctions presently available
extend in authority and fact
beyond mere "military coalition" to the systematic use,
by both international and
national officials, of all
base values by all methods-diplomatic, economic, ideological, and military." The
effects of this power process
upon the distribution of values
in the world can, finally, best
be summarized in terms of
"interdependence," an interdependence of peoples from antipodes to antipodes for all values,
an interdependence which makes any
conception of "national interest,"
apart from the interest of most
peoples of the world, the sheerest
of illusions.
It is not a matter purely of verbal aesthetics what variables in
this world power process are
described as "law." One's use of
a word of such critical significance
may affect understanding and, hence,
control. Thus, the critics of
"law" who use the word to refer
merely to authoritative rules or
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prescribe a wide ~haring of
power and other values, provision of procedures for the
continual review and reformulation of policies and
representation in those
procedures of all people who
are affected, provision of
procedures for the interpretation and application of
policies, and the balancing of
effective power necessary to
make procedures secure and to
put policies into practice.
Within the nation-state people
do not rely alone upon the
projection of doctrine to
secure their values. They
project doctrine in constitutional and other forms, but
they also seek to balance power-within government, as between
functions, legislative, executive,
and judicial, and areally, from
locality to state or province
and region and nation; and
between government and a host
of nongovernmental organizations,
parties, pressure groups, and
pricate associations of all kinds.
Today many, if not most, observers
would agree that no combination
of traditional international
doctrine and "old-fashioned"
diplomatic procedures could be
adequate to secure a comparable
balance in the world arena. The
United Nations, the specialized
agencies, and the regional
organizations offer the beginnings of new commitments and of
new procedures designed to secure
such a balance and to organize
effective community coercion
behind the doctrines of freedom,
peace, and abundance. Our
actual choice is not between
traditional international doctrine
and old-fashioned diplomacy but
between these new commitments
and procedures and world anarchy
and violence. It would seem
most irrational, by a simple
misidentification of "law," to
reject the new because the old has
failed.

activities. The communications process for
effective law are those that assure timely, reliable, comprehensive and open communications. The
communications that are critical for the shaping
of effective law require the open dialectical
process and balanced and responsible criticism
that will give jurists, on a global basis, the
prestige and influence that they must have with
the decision and policy-makers they are to
advise.
Communications arenas in the largest sense
are those involving the peoples of the world,
because they are most likely to gain or lose
through decisions relating to the security among
nations. The challenges and threats among opposing social orders are most frequently made under
hostile conditions, promoting secrecy, and denying
the communications channels operative effectiveness.
Accordingly, as in the arms control agreements in general, it is becoming increasingly
evident that the law that can be projected in the
future into outer space and in general will depend
upon the major power blocs entering into communications, devising more effective communication channels, offering more opportunity to their
peoples to interact and communicate with each
other, and using such communications to seek out
common goals. This is not a recommendation that
can be readily adopted, particularly when the
past practice is examined. Yet even in the
specific instances of extending the reach of the
arms control agreements to qualitative changes in
weaponry it has become increasingly evident that
unless the communications-oriented "confidence
building measures" [and "compliance" building
measures] can be confidently installed, and
effectively applied, there is little likelihood
for real progress. But if they are installed,
there is a strong likelihood for the development
of law itself, and much that was discussed in
this paper may find itself modified by the new
and increasingly common perspectives shared
among peoples everywhere. These will be perspectives that genuinely seek the optimization of
public dignity.
The efforts of jurists, however, are designed
to provide constraints and guidelines consistent
with law--justification and rationalization of
the conduct of states is recognized by all as
the activity of the advocate who may too often
freely dispose of his law as an instrument to
serve his client. Accordingly, the fundamental
question for jurists of our era is whether there
is to be the common, shared attitudes toward law
within a community among states, under shared concepts of law, and aimed at common goals, or
whether the law to be imposed is that law that is
invoked in accordance with the strategies of a
single state, imposed through the exercise of
power, but justified in terms of special
privilege and protections.

Jurists need no longer spend their efforts in
reflecting on the intolerable destruction promised by the major nuclear weapons, or for that
matter, by all of the major conventional weapons,
and the weapons of mass destruction. These are
among the givens or political realities that we
are compelled to face. However, matters that now
require their time are first the clarification of
opposing views relating to how law is to be projected and made effective in the future, the
extent to which law can be promoted through
institutions and procedures and an operative legal
process, and the extent to which lay may be made
a shared strategy for common goals.

All of our law--treaty law and customary
international law--under the broadest rubric of
"compliance"--must be law in which we share
expectations as to effectiveness and enforcement.
This is particularly true for the undertakings
concerning the use of force and weapons, but it
is also true for the larger strategic goals of
a community that seeks to avoid nuclear

All law is dependent for its development upon
communications and communications supportive
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destruction. It is caught in the observations of
Professor Myres McDougal and his associates: 18

the Soviet Union insists "that the process of
defining peaceful coexistence requires participation and consent of the Soviet Union; and, by
implication, that any existing principle or norm
of prior international law that has not been
accepted by the Soviet Union as part of or consistent with peaceful coexistence in general statement
or in particular application has to be rejected as
being for that reason invalid." , [at p. 36]. This
perception appears to coincide with the arguments
made by Professor Tunkin.

The primary aim of a process of
interpretation by an authorized
and controlling community
decision-maker can be formulated in the following proposition: discover the shared
expectations that the parties
to the relevant communication
[ the term "communication"
being used in the largest sense
of intercourse among states]
succeeded in creating in each
other. It would be an act of
distortion on behalf of one party
against another to ascertain and
to give effect to his version of
a supposed agreement if investigation shows that the expectations of this party were not
matched by the expectations of
the other. And it would be an
obvious travesty on interpretation for a community decisionmaker to disregard the shared
subjectivities of the parties
and to substitute arbitrary
assumptions of his own.

Professor George Glnsburgs, addressing the
perceptions of Soviet authorities on the "wars of
national liberation" [ p. 66 et seq.] argues tha
without effective legal conditions on such wars,
without adequate sharing among states in the global
community as to when and under what conditions
such wars should be recognized, and without legal
controls on such wars, they are combined with a
"just war" theory that impairs the principles of
nonaggression. A just" war approach, of course,
automatically puts the government in power as an
aggressor, a war-criminal, and within the "logic"
of this perception not entitled to the protections
of international law including the law of war.
Perhaps a most significant difference in the
approach of the Western scholar and that of
Professor Tunkin lies in the perception of law
itself. Professor Tunkin is concerned with the
challenge to international law and the Western
tradition that is being mounted by the Soviet Union
through its ideological instruments of strategic
policy. The existing law under these perceptions
will be restructured and replaced. The Western
commentator argues, conversely, that there is a
basis, in the value demands among peoples, that
must be fulfilled, and that this is the direction
toward which the legitimatizing processes of an
evolving, emerging law are directed.

In a loose order among states in which
those states are competing increasingly in situations in which their interests overlap and interact, and compete, and are opposing, there are
dangers enough that there may be a shift from the
""interests" of states entitled to protection to
interests identified exclusively with the potential "aggression" and "self-defense"--ambiguous
notions symbolizing uses of force, and embracing
ambiguous notions of regulation.

"Differences of ideologies have always
existed," according to Professor Tunkin. "True
this difference at present is profound. Bu~hen
states agree on recognition of this or that norm as
a norm of international law they do not agree on
problems of ideology ..•. They do agree on rules of
conduct." [From COEXISTENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,
LAW, 95 Acad. de Droit Int., Recueil des Cours
(1958), at pp. 58-611.

ENDNOTES
The purpose of these endnotes is to provide
the sources of citations in the body of the paper,
and to provide supplemental material that bears
upon the arguments and reasons set forth in the
paper. Neither the paper, nor this supplemental
material, can adequately convey the full reach
of the subject pursued, and it must be identified
as a preliminary inquiry. Moreover, because competing policies among governments, addressed by
jurists, are necessarily matters of controversy,
it is presupposed that the inquiry and the inquiries of others will proceed along the critical
path that may lead to constructive outcomes.

While the perspectives of Professor Tunkin
are conditioned and shaped by the Marxist-Leninist
framework in which the outcome of the struggle
between the capitalist and communist (or
"socialist") systems is pre-ordained, and favors,
exclusively, the communist perspectives, the
perspectives of Professor McDougal are that states
in the past and today are shaped within competitive power processes, affected, however, by values
in addition to power (e.g., respect, enlightenment,
wealth, well-being (including safety, health,
character, comfort), rectitude, skill and affection, and that these values are identified by
peoples everywhere in terms of the gathering perspective of human dignity. Clearly, "the power
process of any particular nation-state operates
within the context of the world power process and
both affects and is affected by the larger context. " [At p. 969, in McDougal, et al.,
STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: New Haven and
London: Yale Univ. Press, 1960]. While Professor
Tunkin focuses very closely on power,

Western perspectives on Soviet law are collected conveniently in Hans W. Baade, editor,
THE SOVIET IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, Oceana
Publications: Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1965. While
numerous other commentaries have appeared since
the publication of this book, most of the leading
themes remain unchanged. The most striking opposition to the principle of peaceful coexistence
among Western commentators is identified in the
short essay of Professor Leon Lipson entitled
"Peaceful Coexistence." (p. 27 et seq.). As to
the claim of Professor Grigori Tunkin that the
principle of peaceful coexistence lies "at the
heart of international law," Professor Lipson
concludes his analysis with the observation that
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Professor McDougal argues that law finds its
sources inter alia through the value demands of
the values just mentioned. The broadening reach
of policy and law, of social order and legal order
is then:

One proposition of cardinal
importance should not be forgotten: securing human rights
remains and will remain basically
the domestic affair of states.
Therefore, the principle field
of struggle for human rights is
the internal system of a state,
and especially its socioeconomic
system.
[Grigori Tunkin,
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
Eng. Ed., p. 83).

In a world shrinking at an everaccelerating rate because of
relentlessly expanding, uniformityimposing technology, both opportunity and need for the comparative
study of law are unprecedented.
In this contemporary world, people
are increasingly demanding common
values that transcend the
boundaries of nation-states;
they are increasingly interdependent in fact, irrespective
of nation-state boundaries, for
cotrolling the conditions which
affect the securing of their
values; and they are becoming
ever more realistic in their
consciousness of such interdependences, and hence widening
their identifications to include
in their demands more and more
of their fellow men. [at pp.
947-948).

The pervasive theme of a "correlation of
forces" a?pears in Professor Tunkin's text, and
also in its political counterpart. For example,
Communist Party Secretary Khrushchev declared thai
through such a correlation of forces war could be
prevented, i.e.,
People usually take only one
aspect of the question; they consider only the economic basis of
wars under imperialism. This is
not enough. War is not merely
an economic phenomenon. Whether
there is to be a war or not
depends, in large measure, on
the correlation of class,
political forces, the degree of
organization and the awareness
and resolve of the people.
[In CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES-II, at p. 37, Frederick A.
Praeger, New York, 1957).

The differences between Professor McDougal
and Professor Tunkin are, however, the subject
of the paper itself. The shared, and mutual,
strategy that we might identify with the shaping
and emergence of international law, and with the
nature of that law itself, is the outcome of the
opposing claims and counterclaims among states.
Under present conditions, the challenge and
opposition are such that international law--to the
extent it is shared between the West and the
Soviet Union--is necessarily limited in its impact. Perhaps the main thrust of inter-state
concern has fallen back upon their security, and
perhaps the perceptions of security demand--for
each or most of them--more freedom to act and
less restraint upon how they act. But that, for
this inquiry, will remain a surmise.

The question of public order raised in this
paper requires analysis in greater depth. Public
order, constituted among states, involves a
process akin to the establishment of constitutions. These within the Western democracies have
led to the claims of sovereign rights in the
peoples themselves, and through them the
establishment of law that governs the public
officials. The rights of the individuals--human
rights--remain inviolate under all conditions.
See generally, Charles H. McIlwain,
CONSTITUTIONALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN, Cornell
University Press: Ithaca, New York, 1947.

The distinctions of a major element in th
policy approach of Professor McDougal--that
relating to human rights--and the far lesser
impact that human rights has upon Professor Tunkin
can be found by comparing the massive treatment
by Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and
Lung-Chu Chen, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER. New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press.
1980, with Professor Tunkin's observations that
introduce the settlement of the competitive power
processes as a condition precedent to proceeding
with human rights on the international plane, and
the primary significance accorded such rights to
the domestic plane:

Professor Tunkin carries the application
of the principle of peaceful coexistence to the
full implications in pointing up the development
of the socialist law, applicable to socialist
states, in a socialist commonwealth, and identified as a "higher law." This application was
made as early as 1968 with respect to the
Czechoslovakian crisis and rebellion (pages
238, 438, 446):
International law, just as
national law, inheres in a
class society. But class
society, as has been proved
by the basic tenets of
Marxism, represents merely
a certain stage in the
development of human society,
which also had existed where
there were no classes •.•.

The further development of the
international protection of
human rights depends upon many
circumstances, primarily upon
improving the international situation, terminating the aggressive
activities of imperialist powers,
the arms race they have engendered,
and the aggravation of international
relations.

Mankind is approaching a new
organization of society which
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will not have law, and therefore, not international law.
This, of course, does not mean
that the society of the future
will have no rules of conduct.
A highly-organized human society
as communist society will be,
inevitably presupposes the
existence of rules of conduct .••
The rules of conduct which will
exist in communist society will
by their nature be different
from norms of law. The socialist
principles of respect for state
sovereignty, noninterference in
internal affairs, and equality of
states and peoples differ fundamentally from the corresponding
principels of general international
law; these socialist principles
have another content: the rules
of conduct themselves are changed
partially as part of the content
of the norms and, especially, the
special aspect of the norm changes .•.•
The social consequences of the
operation of socialist international
legal principles differ completely
from the consequences of the operation of norms of general international law. The immediate
reason for this is the qualitative
distinctiveness of the special
aspect of socialist principles from
the principles of general international law and the difference in
the social relations which are regulated by socialist principles, on
one hand, and by principles of
general international law on the
other.

it does not take into account the
specific features of relations
between countries of the socialist
camp. But the specific feature
exists, and it must, since the
question is one of relations
between states of a new historical
type, of relations between states
of a new historical type, of relations between socialist states.
To assert that relations between
socialist countries should be
regulated only by principles of
general international law is to
deny the different class character
of relations between the countries
of socialism, to be derailed from
party principle into the morass of
bourgeois normativism.
Accordingly, the conclusion is that general
international law and the need for the operation
of a principle of peaceful coexistence, along with
the principle of consent, will vanish as the class
struggle comes to an end, terminating through the
rise of socialist states. Those states are not
governed by international law as such but by
socialist commonwealth law--a "higher law." Moreover, this outcome is dictated by historical
materialism, -and the inevitability of social
processes. In other parts of the text, not cited
here, Professor Tunkin does indicate that the
existing, general international law is in itself
being modified by the infusion of the socialist
principles bringing "new" law to bear.
For a recent work on the interaction of
domestic and international law by a Soviet writer
see V.G. Butkevich, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, Kiev, 1981.
According to Professor Hazard in 78 A.J.I.L.
249-50 (1984) the author seeks to restructure the
interaction of domestic and international law with
emphasis on "dialectical unity"--which, according
to Hazard, "will bring into municipal law the
socialist features now being expanded in international bodies." These pressures will--peaceful-]
ly--Iead to the transformation of the capitalist
systems into communist systems. The text is
described as a "closely reasoned program of action
to spread socialist systems around the world,"
with intended impacts on influencing the "formulation of international law."

As a whole these are not general
democratic principles but are
completely different socialist
international legal principles
which relate to a new, higher
type of international law--a
socialist international law.
they aim at strengthening and
developing relations of the
fraternal commonwealth of socialist countries, at ensuring the
construction of socialism and
communism, and at protecting the
gains of socialism from the
infringements of forces hostile
to socialism.

The political and action implications of the
principles of peaceful coexistence are discussed
at length by M.A. Suslov at the 20th Communist
Party Congress. While peaceful measures were
sought to transform global domestic orders into
communism, and while the transformation was
inevitable, the struggle must continue because
"insofar as imperialism remains, the economic
basis for the outbreak of wars also remains."
While war can be deterred through the "balance of
forces," the forms of transition from one social
system to another "depend on the specific historical conditions, and whether the methods are
more peaceful or more violent depends not so much
on the working class as on the extent and forms
of resistance of the exploiting classes which are
being overthrown and which do not wish to part
voluntarily with the vast property, political

This, of course, suggests that the law and the
legal order while operative is to be shaped to
provide certain protections--not only from the
nonsocialist states but from all "nonsocialist
conduct" that arises from within.
Professor Tunkin concludes this theme
(at p. 446):
The theoretical unfoundedness of
the concept equating principles of
relations between countries of the
socialist camp with principles of
general international law is that
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power and other privileges they possess."
[At
pages 75, 76, CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES--II,
DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF THE 20TH COMMUNIST PARTY
CONGRESS. New York. Frederick Praeger. 1957.

LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, Appleton-Century,
New York, 1969.
POSTSCRIPT

FOOTNOTES

This inquiry has clarified the present
realities of state behavior. Currently, states
have failed to resolve their differences over when
force or coercion may permissably be used, while
the actual use of force and the regulation in favor
of moderation has in practice been consistently
abused. They have failed to adopt a shared basis
for making such crucial decisions as these. They
have, accordingly, adopted a shared strategy in
which they continue, through a variety of
strategies of their own, but always favoring
military strategies, to assert claims and counterclaims with regard to each--opposing each other
in competitive processes. Normative or "juristic"
proposals to resolve this stalemate are fruitless
and become polemical and ideological strategies,
pursued for exclusive or unilateral advantage.
While these prescribe what jurists or diplomats
might be seeking as law, they have not been
adopted in the practice of states to project that
law. A future inquiry might now, fruitfully,
examine the possibilities, potentials and
limitations on law and legal processes to promote
the operative uses of law, adopted and shared
while aimed at effectiveness among states--and
aimed at a shared and secure order. Failing this,
states, notwithstanding the claims for lawJwil1
continue to face, as in the past, the uncertainties of hostile relations and the tensions
those hostilities create. Communications limited
to the military arena are notably the communications of threat, confrontation and power.
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